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Abstract
Krivine presented in [9] a methodology to combine Cohen’s forcing with the theory of classical
realizability and showed that the forcing condition can be seen as a reference that is not subject
to backtracks. The underlying classical program transformation was then analyzed by Miquel [11]
in a fully typed setting in classical higher-order arithmetic (PAω+).
As a case study of this methodology, we present a method to extract a Herbrand tree from a
classical realizer of inconsistency, following the ideas underlying the completeness theorem and
the proof of Herbrand’s theorem. Unlike the traditional proof based on Kőnig’s lemma (using a
fixed enumeration of atomic formulas), our method is based on the introduction of a particular
Cohen real. It is formalized as a proof in PAω+, making explicit the construction of generic sets
in this framework in the particular case where the set of forcing conditions is arithmetical.
We then analyze the algorithmic content of this proof.
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1 Introduction
Forcing is a model transformation initially invented by Cohen [1, 2] to prove the relative
consistency of the negation of the continuum hypothesis with respect to the axioms of Zermelo-
Fraenkel (ZF) set theory. From a model-theoretic point of view, forcing is a technique to
extend a given model of ZF—the base model—into a larger model—the generic extension—
generated around the base model from a new set with good properties: the generic filter G.
From a proof-theoretic point of view, forcing can be presented as a logical translation that
maps formulas expressing properties of the extended model into formulas expressing (more
complex) properties of the base model. Through this translation, the properties of the
(fictitious) generic set G (in the extended universe) are reduced to the properties of the
forcing poset C (in the base universe) that parametrizes the whole construction.
Recently, Krivine studied [9] Cohen forcing in the framework of the proofs-as-programs
correspondence in classical logic [5, 13, 3] and showed how to combine it with the theory of
classical realizability [8]. In particular, he discovered a program translation (independent
from typing derivations) that captures the computational contents of the logical translation
underlying forcing. Surprisingly, this program transformation acts as a state passing style
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translation where the forcing condition is treated as a memory cell that is protected from the
backtracks performed by control operators such as callcc [5] —thus opening an intriguing
connection between forcing and imperative programming. Reformulating this work in classical
higher-order arithmetic (PAω+) and analyzing the corresponding program transformation,
Miquel [11, 12] introduced an extension of the Krivine Abstract Machine (KAM) devoted to
execution of proofs by forcing—the KFAM—where the forcing condition is explicitly treated
as a memory cell in the context of the execution of a proof by forcing.
These analogies naturally suggest that Cohen forcing can be used not only to prove
relative consistency results, but also to write computationally more efficient (classical) proofs
by exploiting the imperative flavor of the forcing condition.
In this paper, we propose to instantiate this technique on one example, namely the
extraction of a Herbrand tree (see section 2) from a validity proof of an existential formula
∃~x. F (~x) where F (~x) is quantifier-free. Our extraction procedure is based on a proof of a
mix between completeness and Herbrand’s theorem using the method of forcing. The key
ingredient of this proof is the introduction of a Cohen real (using forcing) that represents all
valuations at once. From a computational point of view, we will see that the corresponding
program uses the forcing condition to store the tree under construction, thus protecting it
from the backtracks induced by classical reasoning. The interest of this approach is that since
the conclusion of our semantic variant of Herbrand’s theorem is Σ01, any proof (program) of
the translation of the conclusion (through the forcing translation) can be turned into a proof
(program) of the conclusion itself. From this, it is then possible to apply standard witness
extraction techniques in classical realizability [10] to extract the desired Herbrand tree.
Contribution of the paper
This work follows on from [9] and [11]. Its contributions are the following:
The extension of the program transformation underlying forcing to a generic filter G
(when the forcing sort and its relativization predicate are invariant under forcing).
A proof of a semantic variant of Herbrand’s theorem (containing completeness) by forcing
where a Cohen real represents all valuations at once in the forcing universe.
A formalization of this proof in the formal system PAω+ which, through the forcing
transformation, gives an extraction process for Herbrand trees.
An analysis of the computational content of this extraction process in classical realizability.
2 Herbrand trees
2.1 The notion of Herbrand tree
In what follows, we work in a given countable first-order language, and write Term and Atom
the countable sets of closed terms and of closed atomic formulas, respectively. Throughout
this paper we are interested in the following problem.
Let ∃~x. F (~x) be a purely existential formula, where F (~x) is quantifier-tree. Let us now
assume that the formula ∃~x. F (~x) is true in all models, and actually in all syntactic models,
where variables are interpreted by closed terms t ∈ Term. From this information, we know
that there is a function H : (Atom → Bool) → −−−→Term that associates to every syntactic
valuation ρ : Atom→ Bool a tuple of closed terms H(ρ) = ~t ∈ −−−→Term such that ρ |= F (~t) (i.e.
a ‘witness’ for the formula ∃~x. F (~x) in the valuation ρ).
However, the information provided by the function H is twice infinite: it is infinite
in depth since each valuation ρ : Atom → Bool is (a priori) infinite, and it is infinite in
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width since the set of all such valuations has the power of continuum. Nevertheless, the
completeness theorem combined with Herbrand’s theorem says that we can compact the
information given by the a priori infinite function H into a finite binary tree, which is called
a Herbrand tree.
I Definition 2.1 (Herbrand tree for a formula F ). A Herbrand tree is a finite binary tree H
such that:
The inner nodes of H are labeled with atomic formulas a ∈ Atom, so that every branch of
the tree represents a partial valuation (going left means ‘true’, going right means ‘false’).
Every leaf of H contains a witness for the corresponding branch, that is a tuple ~t ∈ −−−→Term
s.t. ρ |= F (~t) for every (total) valuation ρ extending that partial valuation of the branch.
I Theorem 2.2. If the formula ∃~x. F (~x) is true in all syntactic models, then F has a
Herbrand tree.
The aim of this paper is to describe a method to effectively extract a Herbrand tree from
a proof (actually a classical realizer) of the proposition expressing that ‘the formula ∃~x. F (~x)
holds in all syntactic models’. Since the latter proposition is directly implied by the formula
∃~x. F (~x) itself (using the trivial implication of the completeness theorem), we will thus get a
method to effectively extract a Herbrand tree from a proof/realizer of the formula ∃~x. F (~x).
Note that we will not give a proof of Theorem 2.2 but rather a proof of the validity of
the admissible rule associated to it, namely: given a proof that ‘the formula ∃~x. F (~x) holds
in all syntactic models’, we can build a proof of existence of a Herbrand tree for F . This
statement is enough for extraction.
2.2 Extracting Herbrand trees effectively
In the framework of the Curry-Howard correspondence, the natural method to extract
Herbrand trees is to use a classical realizer t0 obtained from a formal proof of Theorem 2.2.
By applying t0 to a realizer u of the premise of Theorem 2.2, we get a realizer of the
Σ01-formula expressing the existence of a Herbrand tree for the formula ∃x.F (~x), from which
we can retrieve the desired Herbrand tree using standard classical extraction techniques [10].
However, the efficiency of the extracted code highly depends on the proof of Theorem 2.2.
In particular, the simplest proof of this theorem (Fig. 1), which relies on a fixed enumeration
of all atoms, is not well suited to this task, since it gives terribly poor performances on
Given an enumeration (ai)i∈N of the
closed instances of the atomic formu-
las appearing in F (~x), let us consider
the infinite binary tree whose 2i nodes
at depth i are labeled with the atom
ai. Any infinite branch in this infinite
tree is an valuation ρ, because all atoms
appear along it. From our assumption,
we know that there is a tuple ~t ∈ −−−→Term
such that ρ |= F (~t). But since the cal-
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culation of the truth value of the closed formula F (~t) only relies on a finite subset of ρ, we can
cut the branch along ρ at some depth d, putting a leaf labeled with ~t. Doing this in all branches
simultaneously, we get a finite tree (by the fan theorem), which is by construction a Herbrand tree.
Figure 1 A proof of Theorem 2.2 by enumerating the atoms.
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formulas F (~x) involving atoms that appear late in the chosen enumeration. What we want
is a proof/realizer of Theorem 2.2 that chooses the atoms labeling the nodes only in function
of the realizer of its premise.
In what follows, we present a novel proof of Theorem 2.2 that is tailored for this purpose,
and that relies on the forcing techniques developed in [9, 11, 12]. In this case, the forcing
condition is a Cohen real which behaves as a generic valuation, i.e. it represents all infinite
branches at once. As we will see in section 6, it is computationally a scheduler that will
extend the tree under construction on request, depending on which atoms are required by
the realizer of the premise. It will scan the whole tree and schedule pending branches until
the full Herbrand tree is built.
3 The higher-order arithmetic PAω+
In this section, we recall PAω+, the formal proof system in which this work takes place. It
is a presentation of classical higher-order arithmetic with explicit (classical) proof terms,
inspired by Church’s theory of simple types. It features an extra congruence on terms, in
the spirit of deduction modulo [4]. This section is a summary of the presentation of PAω+
in [11], to which we refer the reader for more details and proofs of the results stated here.
3.1 Syntax
System PAω+ distinguishes three kinds of syntactic entities: sorts (or kinds), higher-order
terms, and proof terms, whose grammar is recalled in Fig 2.
Sorts τ, σ ::= ι | o | τ → σ
Higher-order terms M,N,A,B ::= xτ | λxτ .M | MN | 0 | S | recτ
| A⇒ B | ∀xτ . A | M .=τ N 7→ A
Proof-terms t, u ::= x | λx. t | tu | callcc
Figure 2 Syntax of PAω+.
3.1.1 Sorts and higher-order terms
Sorts are simple types formed from the two basic sorts ι (the sort of individuals) and o
(the sort of propositions). Higher-order terms (also called terms for short) are simply-typed
λ-terms (à la Church) that are intended to represent mathematical objects that inhabit sorts.
Higher-order terms of sort ι, which are called individuals, are formed using the two
constructors 0 (of sort ι), S (of sort ι → ι) and the family of recursors recτ (of sort
τ → (ι→ τ → τ)→ ι→ τ).
Higher-order terms of sort o, which are called propositions (and written A, B, C, etc.
in what follows), are formed using implication A ⇒ B (where A and B are propositions),
universal quantification ∀xτ . A (where A is a proposition possibly depending on the vari-
able xτ ) and a new connective M .=τ N 7→ A called an equational implication (where M
and N are of sort τ and where A is a proposition). This new connective must be thought of
as a kind of implication, but giving more compact proof terms. It makes the computational
contents of the forcing translation more transparent, but it is logically equivalent to the
usual implication M =τ N ⇒ A, via the proof terms:
λxy. y x : (M .= N 7→ A)⇒ (M = N ⇒ A), λx. x (λy. y) : (M = N ⇒ A)⇒ (M .= N 7→ A)
(See fFg. 4 for a definition of the proof system.)
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As usual, application is left associative whereas implication and equational implication are
both right associative and have same precedence: A⇒M .= N 7→ B ⇒ C ⇒ D has to be read
as A⇒ (M .= N 7→ (B ⇒ (C ⇒ D))). Logical connectives (absurdity, negation, conjunction,
disjunction) are defined using the standard second-order encodings, as well as Leibniz
equality, letting: x =τ y := ∀Zτ→o. Z x⇒ Z y. Existential quantification (possibly combined
with conjunctions) is encoded classically using De Morgan laws: ∃xτ . A1 & . . .&Ak :=
¬(∀xτ . A1 ⇒ . . . ⇒ Ak ⇒ ⊥). We often omit the sort annotation τ to ease reading when
this does not hinder understanding. On the opposite, when we want to give explicitly the
sort of a term, we write it in exponent, e.g. Mτ , Ao, recτ→(ι→τ→τ)→ι→ττ .
3.1.2 System T is a fragment of PAω+
Gödel’s system T can be recovered from PAω+ as the subsystem where we restrict sorts
to be T -sorts, that is sorts built with ι as the only base sort. This constraint casts out all
logical constructions and limits the term construction rules exactly to those of system T.
Recall that the expressiveness of system T is exactly the functions which are provably total
in first-order arithmetic, which includes (and exceeds) all primitive recursive functions.
3.2 Proof system
3.2.1 Congruence
The proof system PAω+ differs from higher-order arithmetic by the addition of a congruence
'E to the proof system. This allows to reason modulo some equivalence on higher-order terms
(hence on propositions) without polluting the proof terms with computationally irrelevant
parts.
This congruence contains the usual βηι-conversion, some semantic equivalences on pro-
positions (mostly commutations) and an equational theory E . This equational theory is a
finite set of equations E = M1 = N1, . . . ,Mk = Nk, where Mi and Ni are higher-order terms
of the same sort (that 'E considers equal). Some rules for the congruence 'E are given in
Fig. 3, the full set is given in annex A.
(M = N) ∈ E
M 'E N
M 'E N P 'E Q A 'E,M=P B
M
.= P 7→ A 'E N .= Q 7→ B
M
.= M 7→ A 'E A A⇒M .= N 7→ B 'E M .= N 7→ A⇒ B
x /∈ FV (M,N)
∀xτ .M .= N 7→ A 'E M .= N 7→ ∀xτ . A
Figure 3 Some inference rules for the relation 'E .
3.2.2 Proof terms and inference rules
Proof terms (Fig. 2) are pure λ-terms enriched with an extra constant callcc; they are formed
from a set of proof variables (notation: x, y, z, etc.) distinct from higher-order term variables.
The deduction system of PAω+ is defined around a typing judgment of the form E ; Γ ` t : A,
where E is an equational theory and Γ a context, that is: a finite set of bindings of distinct
proof variables xi to propositions Ai. The inference rules, given in Fig 4, are the ones of
higher-order arithmetic, with slight modifications to deal with the congruence and equational
implication.
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E ; Γ, x : A ` x : A
E ; Γ ` t : A
A 'E A′E ; Γ ` t : A′ E ; Γ ` callcc : ((A⇒ B)⇒ A)⇒ A
E ; Γ, x : A ` t : B
E ; Γ ` λx. t : A⇒ B
E ; Γ ` t : A⇒ B E ; Γ ` u : A
E ; Γ ` t u : B
E ,Mτ = Nτ ; Γ ` t : A
E ; Γ ` t : M .=τ N 7→ A
E ; Γ ` t : M .=τ M 7→ A
E ; Γ ` t : A
E ; Γ ` t : A
x /∈ FV (Γ)E ; Γ ` t : ∀xτ . A
E ; Γ ` t : ∀xτ . A
E ; Γ ` t : A[Nτ/xτ ]
Figure 4 The inference rules of PAω+.
I Remarks.
1. The only inference rules that alter proof terms are the axiom, Peirce’s law, and the
introduction and elimination rules of implication. The remaining rules do not affect proof
terms and are said to be computationally transparent.
2. The proof system of PAω+ enjoys no normalization property since the proposition >
defined by > := λxy. x .=o λxy. y 7→ ⊥ acts as a type of all (untyped) proof terms [11,
section II.E.3]. (Intuitively, > allows to equate any two propositions so that they are all
equivalent to ⊥.) Nevertheless, the system is sound with respect to the intended classical
realizability semantics (see section 3.4).
3. This proof system allows full classical reasoning thanks to Peirce’s law. Arithmetical
reasoning (including reasoning by induction) can be recovered by relativizing all quantifica-
tions over the sort ι using the predicate x ∈ N := ∀Zo. Z 0⇒ (∀yι. Z y ⇒ Z (S y))⇒ Z x
(see below).
3.3 Sets and datatypes
In PAω+, a set is given by a sort τ together with a relativization predicate P of sort τ → o
expressing membership in the set. For instance, the set of total relations between individuals
is given by the sort ι→ ι→ o and the predicate Tot := λR.∀xι.∃yι. R x y.
Because the sort τ can be inferred from the sort of P , we will identify sets with their
relativization predicates. For convenience, we use the suggestive notations x ∈ P (resp.
∀x ∈ P.A, ∃x ∈ P.A) for P x (resp. ∀x. P x⇒ A, ∃x. x ∈ P &A). In what follows, datatypes
will be represented as particular sets based on the sort τ ≡ ι and whose relativization
predicate P is invariant under forcing (see section 4.2). For instance, the datatypes of
Booleans and natural numbers are given by
x ∈ Bool := ∀Zι→o. Z 0⇒ Z 1⇒ Z x
x ∈ N := ∀Zι→o. Z 0⇒ (∀yι. Z y ⇒ Z (S y))⇒ Z x
(The proof of their invariance under forcing is delayed until section 5.2.) We also consider two
abstract datatypes Term and Atom representing closed terms and closed atomic formulas
(whose exact implementation is irrelevant). More generally, inductive datatypes are defined
by implementing constructors as suitable functions from individuals to individuals and by
defining the corresponding predicate by well-known second-order encodings. For instance,
the datatype of binary trees
t, t′ := Leaf ~v | Node a t t′ where ~v ∈ −−−→Term, a ∈ Atom
is given by two injective functions Leafι→ι and Nodeι→ι→ι→ι whose ranges do not overlap
(the actual implementation is irrelevant here) and the corresponding relativization predicate
t ∈ Tree is
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∀Zι→o. (∀~v ∈ Term. Z (Leaf ~v)) ⇒ (∀tι1tι2 a ∈ Atom. Z t1 ⇒ Z t2 ⇒ Z (Node a t1 t2))⇒ Z t .
We also introduce the inductive datatype Comp of quantifier-free formulas built above Atom:
c, c′ := |= | a | cV c′ where a ∈ Atom
This presentation based on implication is more suited to classical realizability (see below),
but Comp is nothing but the free Boolean algebra generated by Atom.
3.4 Realizability semantics
System PAω+ has a classical realizability semantics in the spirit of Krivine’s [8] that is
fully described in [11, 12]. This semantics is based on Krivine’s λc-calculus (which contains
all proof terms of PAω+) and parametrized by a fixed set of processes (the pole of the
realizability model). According to this semantics, every (closed) proof term t of a (closed)
proposition A is a realizer of A (written t  A), and this independently from the choice of
the pole. In the particular case where the pole is empty, the realizability model collapses
to a Tarski model of PAω+, from which we deduce the logical consistency of the system.
This classical realizability semantics also provides simple methods to extract witnesses from
realizers (and thus from proofs) of Σ01-propositions [10].
4 The Forcing Transformation
4.1 Forcing in PAω+
This section is a reformulation of Cohen’s theory of forcing (developed for ZF set theory) in
the framework of PAω+. Here, we see forcing as a translation of facts about objects living in
an extended universe (where sorts intuitively contain much more inhabitants) to facts about
objects living in the base universe. Technically, we will first present forcing as a translation
from PAω+ to itself. But in section 4.3, we will see how to add a generic filter G to PAω+,
so that forcing will be actually a translation from PAω+ +G to PAω+. We follow here the
presentation of [11, 12], where the reader may find all missing proofs.
4.1.1 Definition of a forcing structure
As in [9, 11], we introduce the set of conditions as an upward closed subset C of a meet-
semilattice (κ, ·, 1). (Any poset with a greatest element can be presented in this way.)
I Definition 4.1 (Forcing structure). A forcing structure is given by:
a set C : κ→ o of well-formed forcing conditions (p ∈ C being usually written C[p]),
an operation · of sort κ → κ → κ to form the meet of two conditions (denoted by
juxtaposition),
a greatest condition 1,
nine closed proof terms representing the axioms that must be satisfied by the forcing
structure:
α0 : C[1] α1 : ∀pq. C[pq]⇒ C[p] α2 : ∀pq. C[pq]⇒ C[q]
α3 : ∀pq. C[pq]⇒ C[qp] α4 : ∀p. C[p]⇒ C[pp] α5 : ∀pqr. C[(pq)r]⇒ C[p(qr)]
α6 : ∀pqr. C[p(qr)]⇒ C[(pq)r] α7 : ∀p. C[p]⇒ C[p1] α8 : ∀p. C[p]⇒ C[1p]
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(σ → τ)∗ := σ∗ → τ∗ ι∗ := ι o∗ := κ→ o
(xτ )∗ := xτ∗ 0∗ := 0 (∀xτ . A)∗ := λrκ. ∀xτ∗ . A∗ r
λxτ .M := λxτ∗ .M∗ S∗ := S (M .= N 7→ A)∗ := λrκ.M∗ .= N∗ 7→ A∗ r
(M N)∗ := M∗N∗ rec∗τ := recτ∗ (A⇒ B)∗ := λrκ. ∀qκ∀(r′)κ. r .= qr′ 7→
(∀sκ. C[qs]⇒ A∗ s)⇒ B∗ r′
x∗ := x (λx. t)∗ := γ1(λx. t∗[(β3y)/y][(β4x)/x]) y 6= x
(t u)∗ := γ3 t∗ u∗ callcc∗ := λcx. callcc(λk. x (α14 c) (λcy. k (y α15 c)))
β3 := λxc. x (α9 c) β4 := λxc. x (α10 c) γ1 := λxcy. x y (α6 c) γ3 := λxyc. x (α11c) y
Figure 5 The forcing translations τ 7→ τ∗, M 7→M∗ and t 7→ t∗.
(This set of axioms is not minimal, since α2, α6 and α8 can be defined from the others.)
The above axioms basically express that the set C is upward-closed with respect to the
pre-ordering p ≤ q (‘p is stronger than q’) defined by p ≤ q := ∀rκ. C[pr]⇒ C[qr]. From this
definition of the preorder p ≤ q, we easily check that pq is the meet of p and q and that 1 is
the greatest element. On the other hand, all the elements of κ outside C are equivalent with
respect to the ordering ≤; they intuitively represent an ‘inconsistent condition’ stronger than
all well-formed conditions.
In what follows, we will also need the following derived combinators:
α9 := α3 ◦ α1 ◦ α6 ◦ α3 : ∀pqr. C[pqr]⇒ C[pr] α10 := α2 ◦ α5 : ∀pqr. C[pqr]⇒ C[qr]
α11 := α9 ◦ α4 : ∀pq. C[pq]⇒ C[p(pq)] α12 := α5 ◦ α3 : ∀pqr. C[p(qr)]⇒ C[q(rp)]
α13 := α3 ◦ α12 : ∀pqr. C[p(qr)]⇒ C[(rp)q]
α14 := α12 ◦ α10 ◦ α4 ◦ α2 : ∀pqr. C[p(qr)]⇒ C[q(rr)] α15 := α9 ◦ α3 : ∀pqr. C[p(qr)]⇒ C[qp]
where αi ◦ αj ◦ · · · ◦ αk stands for λc. αi (αj . . . (αk c) . . . ) with c a fresh proof variable.
4.1.2 The three forcing translations
Given a forcing structure, the forcing transformation consists of three translations: τ 7→ τ∗ on
sorts, M 7→M∗ on higher-order terms (which is extended point-wise to equational theories)
and t 7→ t∗ on proof terms. The translations are given figure 5 (see [12] for the definition of
all combinators).
I Remarks.
1. The translation on sorts simply replaces occurrences of o by κ → o. This means that
propositions will now depend on an extra parameter which is a forcing condition.
2. The translation on (higher-order) terms changes the sort of the term: Nτ is turned into
(N∗)τ∗ . The heart of this translation lies in the implication case and it merely propagates
through the connectives in all the other cases.
3. The proof term translation instrumentalizes the computational interaction between
abstractions and applications in proof terms:
it adds the γ3 combinator in front of applications;
it shows the de Bruijn structure of bound variables: if an occurrence of the bound
variable x has de Bruijn index n, it will be translated to βn3 (β4 x).
4.1.3 The forcing transformation on propositions
From the translation on terms, we define the usual forcing relation p F A on propositions,
letting:
p F A := ∀rκ. C[pr]⇒ A∗r .
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This definition extends point-wise to contexts and we write it p F Γ. In addition to
the expected properties of substitutivity and compatibility with the congruences 'E , this
transformation on propositions enjoys the following important properties:
I Proposition 4.2.
1. Forcing strongly commutes with universal quantification and equational implication:
p F ∀xτ . A ' ∀xτ∗. (p F A) p F (M .=τ N 7→ A) ' M∗ .=τ∗ N∗ 7→ (p F A)
2. Forcing is anti-monotonic: ∀pq. (p F A)⇒ (pq F A)
3. Forcing an implication: p F A⇒ B ⇐⇒ ∀qκ. (q F A)⇒ (pq F B)
I Theorem 4.3 (Soundness). If the judgment E ; Γ ` t : A is derivable in PAω+, then the
judgment E∗; (p F Γ) ` t∗ : p F A is derivable in PAω+.
This theorem is thus an effective way to turn a proof term t : A (expressed in the forcing
universe) into a proof term t∗ : p F A (expressed in the base universe).
4.2 Invariance under forcing
Clearly, the sorts that are invariant under the forcing translation are exactly the T -sorts
defining Gödel’s system T (see section 3.1.2). A proposition A whose free variables live in
T -sorts is said to be invariant under forcing or absolute when there exist two closed proof
terms ξA and ξ′A such that
ξA : ∀p. (p F A)⇒ (C[p]⇒ A) ξ′A : ∀p. (C[p]⇒ A)⇒ (p F A) .
An important class of absolute propositions is the class of first-order propositions, which
contains the subclass of arithmetical propositions (in which all quantifications are relativized).
I Definition 4.4 (First-order propositions). First-order propositions are defined by
A,B := ⊥ | Mτ = Nτ | A⇒ B | ∀xσ. A | M ι ∈ N
where σ and τ are T -sorts (see section 3.1.2).
I Theorem 4.5 (Invariance). All first-order propositions are invariant under forcing.
I Theorem 4.6 (Elimination of a forced hypothesis). If the propositions 1 F A and A⇒ B
are derivable (in the empty context) and if B is absolute, then B is derivable too (in the
empty context).
Proof. Let u and s be proof terms such that u : A⇒ B and s : 1 F A. Using theorem 4.3,
we have u∗ : 1 F A⇒ B. Because B is invariant under forcing, the previous theorem gives
us ξB : (1 F B)⇒ C[1]⇒ B. We finally get ξB (γ3 u∗ s)α0 : B. J
This theorem will be used to remove forcing in the proof of existence of a Herbrand tree.
4.3 The generic filter G
We now introduce PAω+ +G, which extends PAω+ with a constant G (the generic filter)
and its axioms. To do so, we first assume that κ ≡ κ∗ (it is a T -sort) and that the set of
well-formed conditions C (of sort κ → o) is absolute, so that we have two proof terms ξC
and ξ′C such that
ξC : ∀pq. (p F C[q])⇒ (C[p]⇒ C[q]) ξ′C : ∀pq. (C[p]⇒ C[q])⇒ (p F C[q]) .
(At this stage, we do not need to know the particular implementation of C.)
The proof system PAω+ +G is defined from PAω+ by adding a constant G of sort κ→ o
and five axioms expressing its properties. The first four axioms say that G is a filter in C:
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A1 : G is a subset of C: ∀p. p ∈ G⇒ C[p],
A2 : G is non empty: 1 ∈ G,
A3 : G is upward closed: ∀pq. pq ∈ G⇒ p ∈ G,
A4 : G is closed under product: ∀pq. p ∈ G⇒ q ∈ G⇒ pq ∈ G,
The last axiom—genericity—relies on the following notion:
I Definition 4.7 (Dense subset). A set D of sort κ→ o is said dense in C if for every element
p ∈ C, there is an element q ∈ C belonging to D and smaller than p. Formally, we let:
D dense := ∀pκ. C[p]⇒ ∃qκ. C[pq] & pq ∈ D (⇔ ∀pκ. C[p]⇒ ∃qκ. C[q] & q ∈ D& q ≤ p)
The last axiom on the set G is then:
A5 : G intersects every set Dκ→o (of the base universe) dense in C:
(∀p. C[p]⇒ ∃q. C[pq] & pq ∈ D) ⇒ ∃p. p ∈ G& p ∈ D.
Now we need to explain how the forcing translation extends to a translation from PAω++G
to PAω+. The term translation on the generic filter G is defined by G∗ := λpr. C[pr]. This
definition has the advantage of giving a very simple proposition for p F q ∈ G:
I Fact 4.8. p F q ∈ G := ∀r. C[pr]⇒ (q ∈ G)∗r ' ∀r. C[pr]⇒ C[qr] ' p ≤ q
We now need to prove the proposition ∀pκ. p F Ai (in PAω+) for each of the five axioms
A1–A5 of the generic filter G. Thanks to proposition 4.2 (anti-monotonicity), it is sufficient
to prove that 1 F Ai. Notice that the proof terms justifying the filter properties of G are
small, except the proof term for genericity (the most complex property).
I Proposition 4.9 (Forcing the properties of G).
γ1 (λx. ξ′C (α1 ◦ x ◦ α3)) : 1 F ∀p. p ∈ G⇒ C[p] (4.9.i)
λx. x : 1 F 1 ∈ G (4.9.ii)
γ1 (λx. α9 ◦ x ◦ α10) : 1 F ∀pq. pq ∈ G⇒ p ∈ G (4.9.iii)
γ1(λx. γ1 (λy. α13 ◦ y ◦ α12 ◦ x ◦ α2 ◦ α5 ◦ α5)) : 1 F ∀pq. p ∈ G⇒ q ∈ G⇒ pq ∈ G
(4.9.iv)
γ1 (λx. γ1 (λy. ξ′⊥ (λc. ξ∃2 ξC ξD(γ3 x (ξ′c (λ_. c))) (α2 (α1 c))
(λc′d. ξ⊥ (γ3 (γ3 (β3 (β4 y)) I) (ξ′D (λ_. d))) c′))))
: 1 F (∀p. C[p]⇒ ∃q. C[pq] & pq ∈ D)⇒ ∃p. p ∈ G& p ∈ D (4.9.v)
where ξ∃2 is the proof term (built using theorem 4.5) such that
ξ∃2 ξA ξB : (p F ∃n.A&B)⇒ (C[p]⇒ ∃n.A&B)
5 A proof of Herbrand’s theorem by forcing
In order not to alter the meaning of the forcing poset through the forcing transformation, we
choose to let κ := ι (the sort of individuals), because ι∗ ≡ ι.
5.1 Interface for finite relations over Atom× Bool
We describe here an interface implementing finite relations over pairs of atoms and Booleans
together with some operations (union, membership test) and properties. Everything can be
implemented for instance by finite ordered lists of pairs (in the sort ι) without repetition.
We assume given &&ι→ι→ι and ||ι→ι→ι, the (infix) Boolean conjunction and disjunction (at
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the term level) together with their defining equations (e.g. 1 && b ' b) that must hold at
the congruence level (typically by β-reduction for suitable definitions of && and ||). Let us
first describe the terms of the interface.
∅ι : the empty relation singι→ι→ι : sing a b denotes {(a, b)} and is written ab
∪ι→ι→ι : union (infix symbol) testι→ι→ι→ι : test p a b tests if the atom a is mapped to b in p
The required properties over this structure are:
associativity, commutativity and idempotence of ∪
∅ is a neutral element for ∪
the specification equations of test: for all a, a′, b, b′, p, q with a 6= a′ or b 6= b′,
test ∅ a b = 0 test ab a b = 1 test ab a′ b′ = 0 test (p∪ q) a b = test p a b || test q a b
Using these terms and properties, we define two operations:
testing membership: mem a p := test p a 1 || test p a 0
adding the binding (a, b) to p: p∪ ab
Among finite relations, we can distinguish those that are functional, i.e. those representing
finite functions from Atom to Booleans. We call them finite valuations and denote their
set by FVal. Formally, this set (in the sense of section 3.3) is inductively defined using the
following second-order encoding, which encompasses both finiteness and functionality:
p ∈ FVal := ∀Zι→o. Z ∅ ⇒ (∀rι.∀a ∈ Atom. mem a r .=ι 0 7→ Z r ⇒ Z (r∪ a1))⇒
(∀rι.∀a ∈ Atom. mem a r .=ι 0 7→ Z r ⇒ Z (r∪ a0))⇒ Z p
This shows the underlying computational structure of finite valuations: they are isomorphic
to lists of atoms with two cons constructors (one for the atoms mapped to true, one for
those mapped to false) without duplicates (thanks to the precondition mem a r .=ι 0 7→ . . .
in the cons constructors).
Finally, we assume the existence of a function for testing membership, that is a proof
term Tottest of the totality of test on finite valuations:
Tottest : ∀p ∈ FVal.∀a ∈ Atom.∀b ∈ Bool. test p a b ∈ Bool .
5.2 Programming in PAω+
In order to ease writing proof terms in PAω+, we introduce some macros:
〈a, b〉 λf. f a b let (x, y) = c in M c (λxy.M)
true, false λxy. x, λxy. y if b then f else g b f g
consT a p λx1x2x3. x2 a (p x1 x2 x3) consF a p λx1x2x3. x3 a (p x1 x2 x3)
They come with the inference rules (admissible in PAω+) given Fig. 6.
E ; Γ `M : A E ; Γ ` N : B
E ; Γ ` 〈M,N〉 : A ∧B
E ; Γ `M : A ∧B E ; Γ, x : A, y : B ` N : C
x, y /∈ FV (M)E ; Γ ` let (x, y) = M in N : C
E ; Γ ` true : 1 ∈ Bool E ; Γ ` false : 0 ∈ Bool
E ; Γ `M : b ∈ Bool E ; Γ ` N : b .= 1 7→ A E ; Γ ` P : b .= 0 7→ A
E ; Γ ` if M then N else P : A
E ; Γ `M : a ∈ Atom E ; Γ ` N : p ∈ FVal
mem a p 'E 0E ; Γ ` consTMN : p∪ a1 ∈ FVal + idem for consF with p∪ a
0 ∈ FVal
Figure 6 Admissible inference rules in PAω+.
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5.3 Definition of our forcing structure
The interface and functions defined in the previous two sections allow us to build the forcing
structure that we will use for Herbrand’s theorem. In this setting, finite valuations will
represent pieces of information about the current valuation that will be used to decide which
closed instance of the proposition F (~x) is false. Note that most combinators are the identity
thanks to the properties we imposed on the implementation of finite relations.
I Definition 5.1 (Forcing structure for Herbrand’s theorem). Our forcing structure is given by
κ := ι C[p] := p ∈ FVal ∧ (subH p⇒ subH ∅) p · q := p∪ q
1 := ∅ α3 = α4 = α5 = α6 = α7 = α8 := I α0 := 〈λxyz. z, I〉
α1 = α2 := λc. let (p, t) = c in 〈UpFVal p, λx. let (x1, x2) = x in t 〈x1,MonsubHtree x2〉〉
(UpFVal and MonsubHtree will be defined in section 5.4.)
I Remarks.
1. We can simplify α1 further if we replace MonsubHtree by I (which is a realizer of the
same formula, see the remark after lemma 5.4). Note that in this case, α1 is no longer
a proof term but only a realizer (which is enough for our purpose) and we can write it
α1 := λc. let (c1, c2) = c in 〈UpFVal c1, c2〉.
2. Once we have proven the existence of a Herbrand tree (that is subH ∅), the second part of
the definition of the set C (subH p⇒ subH ∅) is trivial. Therefore, the set C is logically
equivalent to its first part FVal, the set of finite functions from Atom to Bool. It is
interesting to notice that when Atom = N, this is exactly the forcing conditions used to
add a Cohen real [7]. This remark means that our forcing structure actually adds a single
Cohen real (in the extended universe) which turns out to be the model we seek. It is a
simple exercise of forcing to show that this real number is different from all real numbers
of the base universe and that it is non computable.
In order to use all the results of section 4 and to be able to remove forcing using
theorem 4.6, we need to prove that both subH and C are absolute.
I Proposition 5.2. The sets Tree, subH, FVal and C are invariant under forcing.
Proof. There exist proof terms in PAω+ proving these properties. For instance, we have:
ξC := ξ∧ ξFVal (ξ⇒ ξ′subH ξsubH) ξ′C := ξ′∧ ξ′FVal (ξ′⇒ ξsubH ξ′subH) J
5.4 Formal statement of Herbrand’s theorem in PAω+
We now formalize in PAω+ the statement of Herbrand’s theorem presented in section 2 as:
If F (~x) is a quantifier-free formula and all syntactic valuations validate ∃~x. F (~x),
then ∃~x. F (~x) has a Herbrand tree.
Since we consider atomic formulas as elements of an abstract datatype (of sort ι) rep-
resented by the set Atom, a valuation is completely determined by its values on atoms
and is thus defined as a function from atoms to propositions that we represent by a term
of sort ι → o. We can extend a valuation ρ to quantifier-free formulas by the function
interp(ι→o)→ι→o recursively defined by the following equations.
interp ρ |= := ⊥ interp ρ a := ρ a interp ρ (cV c′) := (interp ρ c)⇒ (interp ρ c′)
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The formula F (~x) is represented by a term V ι→ι mapping any ~v to the corresponding
quantifier-free formula F (~v) in Comp. The premise of Herbrand’s theorem becomes the
formula ∀ρι→o.∃~v ∈ Term. interp ρ (V ~v).
We now need to define the proposition expressing that a binary tree is a Herbrand tree.
Checking the correctness of a Herbrand tree is completely computational:
1. go down the tree and remember the partial valuation of your current branch,
2. evaluate V ~v at the leaves using the partial valuation accumulated so far.
This process is performed by the function subHtree recursively defined by these equations.
subHtree p (Node a t1 t2) := subHtree pa1 t1 && subHtree pa0 t2
subHtree p (Leaf ~v) := eval p (V ~v) 1
The case of leaves is treated using a Boolean function evalι→ι→ι→ι checking whether the
truth value of V ~v (2nd arg.) is equal to b (3rd arg.) in the valuation p (1st arg.). The only
non trivial case is the case of an atom where we need to look for the binding (a, b) into p,
which can be done by the test function (see section 5.1). Since p is partial, eval p (V ~v) b = 0
can have two causes: either the truth value of V ~v in p is 1− b or p does not contain enough
information to evaluate V ~v. Conversely, when eval p (V ~v) b = 1, it means both that p
contains enough information to evaluate V ~v and that the result is b. When subHtree p t = 1,
we say that t is a Herbrand tree below p. Using subHtree, we finally define the predicate
subH p expressing the existence of a Herbrand tree below the finite (and partial) valuation p:
subH p := ∃t ∈ Tree. subHtree p t = 1.
Summing up, the formal statement of Herbrand’s theorem in PAω+ is
(∀ρι→o.∃~v ∈ Term.¬ interp ρ (V ~v))⇒ subH ∅ . (H)
I Lemma 5.3 (subH-merging). Let p be a partial valuation and let a be an atom not appearing
in p. If we have both subH pa1 and subH pa0, then we have subH p.
Proof. If t1 and t2 are Herbrand trees below pa1 and pa0 respectively, then Node a t1 t2 is
a Herbrand tree below p. In PAω+, this lemma is formally stated and proved as follows.
merge := λxaxy. let (x1, x2) = x in let (y1, y2) = y in 〈Node xa x1 y1, y2 ◦ x2〉
: ∀pι.∀a ∈ Atom. mem a p .= 0 7→ subH pa1 ⇒ subH pa0 ⇒ subH p J
I Lemma 5.4 (Monotonicity). The functions test, eval and subHtree are monotonic in p.
Proof. There exists proof terms Montest, Moneval and MonsubHtree of the propositions
∀pqab. test p a b = 1⇒ test (p∪ q) a b = 1
∀pq.∀c ∈ Comp.∀b ∈ Bool. eval p c b = 1⇒ eval (p∪ q) c b = 1
∀pq.∀t ∈ Tree. subHtree p t = 1⇒ subHtree(p∪ q) t = 1 .
For instance, we have Montest := λxy. x y. J
I Remark. In practice, there is no need to build formal proofs in PAω+ of monotonicity
since their unrelativized version are realized by the identity (they are Horn formulas, true in
the standard model): we can use them in proofs as axioms and later realize them by I.
I Lemma 5.5 (FVal is upward-closed). For all p and q, if (p∪ q) ∈ FVal, then p ∈ FVal.
Proof. There exists a proof term UpFVal : ∀pq. (p∪ q) ∈ FVal⇒ p ∈ FVal. J
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5.5 The full proof
5.5.1 The big picture
Now that we have our forcing setting, we can turn to the proof itself. It will be split between
the base (B) and forcing universes (F) as shown by the following steps:
1. B Assume the premise ∀ρι→o.∃~v ∈ Term.¬ interp ρ (V ~v).
2. F Lift the premise to the forcing universe.
3. F Make the proof: t : subH ∅.
4. B Use the forcing translation: t∗ : 1 F subH ∅.
5. B Remove forcing: ξsubH t∗α0 : subH ∅.
6. B Extract a witness.
I Remarks.
1. Steps 1 and 2 are automatic (a proof in the base universe is correct in the forcing one),
2. Step 5 has already been explained in the general case,
3. Step 6 uses standard classical realizability techniques and will not be discussed here.
4. Since the premise is not absolute (because of the quantification over valuations ρ of sort
ι→ o), we do not have a proof of Herbrand’s theorem (in the base universe) and only get
this admissible rule (see section 2.1): E ; Γ ` u : ∀ρ
ι→o.∃~v ∈ Term. interp ρ (V ~v)
E ; Γ ` t(u) : subH ∅ .
5.5.2 The proof in the forcing universe (step 3)
Recall the formal statement of Herbrand’s theorem (H) given in section 5.4. Since we are now
in the forcing universe, we can use the properties of the generic filter G given in section 4.3.
As usual with proof in forcing, we start by building the generic valuation g =
⋃
G, which is
legal because G is a filter. We would like to let g :=
⋃
G and prove that it is total. However,
its simpler to define g := λa.∃p ∈ G. test p a 1 = 1 (total by definition) and then prove that
it is equal to the union of G. To do so, instead of full genericity, we use a specialized axiom
∀a ∈ Atom.∃p ∈ G. ∃b ∈ Bool. test p a b = 1 . (A)
First of all, we lift this axiom to quantifier-free formulas:
I Lemma 5.6 (Evaluation by G). There exists a proof term proving the proposition
∀c ∈ Comp.∃p ∈ G.∃b ∈ Bool. eval p c b = 1 & if b then interp g c else ¬(interp g c) .
Proof. The second part of the conjunct simply says that g must interpret a quantifier-free
formula c exactly as any p in G would do, which is obvious by definition of g. We can therefore
focus our attention on the first part on the conjunct, which is proved by induction on c, using
property (4.9.iv) for the case of implication and axiom (A) for the case of atom. J
Because g is a valuation, we can feed it to the premise of (H) to get terms ~v such that
~v ∈ Term (1) and ¬ interp g (V ~v) (2). Using lemma 5.6 above with V ~v, we get p ∈ G and
b ∈ Bool such that eval p (V ~v) b = 1 (3) and if b then interp g (V ~v) else ¬(interp g (V ~v)) (4).
Since b ∈ Bool, we can make a case analysis:
1. b = 1: By (4), we have interp g (V ~v) which is in contradiction with (2).
2. b = 0: The equation (3) gives us eval p (V ~v) 0 = 1 which, combined with (1), makes a
proof of subH p (take t := Leaf ~v). But p ∈ G and G ⊂ C so that we have C[p] and thus
subH p⇒ subH ∅ which allows us to conclude.
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λcaf. let (p, t) = α1 c in a′ := ξAtom a (α1 c) : a ∈ Atom
if Tottest p a′ true then f (α1 c) I true∗ I∗ else
if Tottest p a′ false then f (α1 c) I false∗ I∗ else
f 〈UpFVal (consT a′ p), λt1. f 〈UpFVal (consF a′ p), λt2. t (merge a′ t1 t2)〉 I false∗ I∗〉 I true∗ I∗
Figure 7 The program realizing the axiom (A).
5.5.3 Back to the base universe (step 4)
Converting our proof term t : subH ∅ in the forcing universe into a proof term t∗ : 1 F subH ∅
in the base universe follows exactly the methodology of section 4. The only subtlety is that
instead of the genericity property of G (property (4.9.v)), we use the axiom (A) and we now
need to translate it.
I Proposition 5.7 (Forcing the axiom (A)). There is a proof term in PAω+ proving
1 F ∀a ∈ Atom.¬(∀pb. p ∈ G⇒ b ∈ Bool⇒ test p a b = 1⇒ ⊥) .
Proof. The corresponding realizer is given in Fig. 7. Note that we use the simplified version
of α1. The (textual) proof is given in annex B. J
6 Computational interpretation
By analyzing the proof from the previous section, we obtain an algorithm for computing
Herbrand trees. In order to study this algorithm, we use Krivine’s classical realizability (see
section 3.4), the setting in which the computational content of forcing has been studied [9, 11].
Overall, the interest of using forcing in this case is twofold. First, it allows to reason (in
the forcing universe) on a single valuation, the generic valuation, instead of considering all of
them. The forcing translation takes care of ‘moving’ this generic valuation across the tree to
make sure we cover every possible branch. In short, forcing transparently manages the tree
structure. Second, the forcing condition stores the tree under construction (see below), thus
protecting it from any backtrack that might occur in the realizer of the premise of (H).
Computationally, a realizer of C[p] is a dependent type of a zipper [6] at position p. Its
first part (p ∈ FVal) behaves as a finite list of atoms with two cons constructors, representing
a finite approximation of the generic valuation g. Its second part (subH p⇒ subH ∅) is the
return continuation: provided we can find a Herbrand tree below p, we have a full Herbrand
tree; it represents a tree context where the hole is at position p.
From this perspective, the key ingredient of the proof is axiom (A), which is responsible
for the insertion of new nodes in the Herbrand tree and the scheduling of the computation of
the subtrees. Indeed, it is the only place where the second component of the forcing condition
(the tree context) is modified. It can be seen as the primitive called by the user program (the
premise) to build the tree, like a system call giving access to g: given an atom a, this program
(given Fig. 7) computes the truth value b of a in g, together with a witness of its answer:
p ∈ G containing a (remember that g = ⋃G). To do so, it first checks whether a belongs
to the current forcing condition q and if so, returns the associated value (lines 2 & 3) by
feeding it to its continuation f . When a does not belong to q, we need to extend q. Since a
can be mapped to either true or false in g, we consider both cases and hence make two calls
to f (last line). These two calls can be understood intuitively as follows: first we lead f to
believe we have a tree context for p := qa1 (i.e. a fictitious realizer T ′ of subH qa1 ⇒ subH ∅)
although at the time, we only have one for q. When the computation inside f uses T ′, it
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must provide a Herbrand tree t1 below qa1. We then swap branches and call f again with
p := qa0 because this time, we do have a tree context for qa0, namely λt2. t (merge a t1 t2).
Summing up, this last line contains both the extension of the tree (in merge a u v) and the
scheduling of the subtree computation (the two calls to f).
Furthermore, our realizer is completely intuitionistic (no callcc), which means that any
backtrack during execution originates from the realizer of the premise of (H) and cannot
affect the partial tree under construction which is stored in the second part of C[p]. Indeed
callcc∗ takes care of saving and restoring the forcing condition. This restricted form of
backtrack becomes a real instruction in the KFAM [12] (Krivine’s Forcing Abstract Machine)
which hard-wires the forcing translation of section 4 and features two execution modes:
a real mode where terms have their usual KAM behavior,
a forcing mode (or protected mode) where the first slot on the stack is considered as
a forcing condition and terms behave as if they were translated through the forcing
transformation.
In this machine, the premise of Herbrand’s theorem would be executed only in forcing mode
and could not affect the forcing condition (stored on the first slot of the stack).
Finally, the proof of section 5.5.2 in the forcing universe PAω+ +G never uses the upward
closure of G (property 4.9.iii). This means that we do not need to erase information from
the partial Herbrand tree and suggests that our realizer is efficient.
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A Definition of the congruence relation
Reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity and base case
M 'E M
M 'E N
N 'E M
M 'E N N 'E P
M 'E P
(M = N) ∈ E
M 'E N
Context closure
M 'E N
λx.M 'E λx.N
A 'E B
∀xτ . A 'E ∀xτ . B
M 'E N P 'E Q
M P 'E N Q
A 'E B C 'E D
A⇒ C 'E B ⇒ D
M 'E N P 'E Q A 'E,M=P B
M
.= P 7→ A 'E N .= Q 7→ B
β η ι-conversion
(λxτ .M)Nτ 'E M [Nτ/xτ ]
x /∈ FV (M)
λx.M x 'E M
recτ M N 0 'E M recτ M N(S P ) 'E N P (recτ M N P )
Semantically equivalent propositions
∀xτ∀yσ. A 'E ∀yσ∀xτ . A
x /∈ FV (A)∀xτ . A 'E A
x /∈ FV (A)
A⇒ ∀xτ . B 'E ∀xτ . A⇒ B
M
.= M 7→ A 'E A M .= N 7→ A 'E N .= M 7→ A
M
.= N 7→ P .= Q 7→ A 'E P .= Q 7→M .= N 7→ A
A⇒M .= N 7→ B 'E M .= N 7→ A⇒ B
x /∈ FV (M,N)∀xτ .M .= N 7→ A 'E M .= N 7→ ∀xτ . A
B Proof that the axiom (A) is forced
We want to prove (in PAω+) that 1 F ∀a ∈ Atom.∃p ∈ G. ∃b ∈ Bool. test p a b = 1. Unfolding
the existential quantifiers, we need to prove
1 F ∀a ∈ Atom.¬(∀p ∈ G.∀b ∈ Bool. test p a b = 1⇒ ⊥),
that is
1 F ∀a. a ∈ Atom⇒ ¬(∀p∀b. p ∈ G⇒ b ∈ Bool⇒ test p a b = 1⇒ ⊥) .
Using proposition 4.2, it amounts to proving (1qa)qf F ⊥ given
xa : qa F a ∈ Atom
xf : qf F ∀p∀b. p ∈ G⇒ b ∈ Bool⇒ test p a b = 1⇒ ⊥ .
Since 1 is neutral for the product, this is the same as proving that qaqf F ⊥. With repeated
use of γ3, we can turn xf into y := λuv. γ3(γ3 (γ3 (β4 y)u) v) which is a proof term for
∀q∀p∀b. (qqf F p ∈ G)⇒ (qqf F b ∈ Bool)⇒ (qqf F test p a b = 1)⇒ (qqf F ⊥) .
Because test is total and we have Tottest : ∀p ∈ FVal.∀a ∈ Atom.∀b ∈ Bool. test p a b ∈ Bool
(both assumed in the interface for finite relations), we can proceed by case analysis:
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test (qaqf ) a 1 = 1: We take p := qaqf and b := 1. We use y with q := qa to prove
qaqf F ⊥ so that we have to prove its premises:
I : qaqf ≤ qaqf ≡ qaqf F qaqf ∈ G,
γ1(λu. γ1(λv. β4 (β3 u))) : qaqf F 1 ∈ Bool,
I∗ : qaqf F test (qaqf ) a 1 = 1 because the equality holds in the equational theory
(thanks to the case analysis).
test (qaqf ) a 0 = 1: It is similar to the previous case.
test (qaqf ) a 1 = 0 and test (qaqf ) a 0 = 0: This case means that a does not appear in
qaqf .
We use ξ′⊥ and we are left to prove C[qaqf ] ⇒ ⊥. We first prove C[(qaa1)qf ] ⇒ ⊥ by
using first ξ⊥ then y with q ≡ p := qaa1 and b := 1.
α9 : (qaa1)qf ≤ qaa1 ≡ (qaa1)qf F qaa1 ∈ G because product is the glb for ≤,
(qaa1)qf F 1 ∈ Bool proved as before,
(qaa1)qf F test (qaa1) a 1 = 1 proved as before.
In a similar fashion, we prove C[(qaa0)qf ]⇒ ⊥.
Let us come back to the proof of C[qaqf ]⇒ ⊥. Assume C[qaqf ]. Applying the proof term
for C[(qaa1)qf ]⇒ ⊥, we have to prove C[(qaa1)qf ] ≡ (qaa1)qf ∈ FVal∧(subH (qaa1)qf ⇒
subH ∅). The first part present no difficulty because we have C[qaqf ] and mem a (qaqf ) = 0:
we just need to apply the second constructor of FVal. For the second part, we assume
subH (qaa1)qf and we want to prove subH ∅. Instead we choose to prove ⊥ ≡ ∀Z.Z.
Applying again the same method with C[(qaa0)q]⇒ ⊥, we end up proving subH ∅ with
subH (qaa1)q and subH (qaa0)qf as extra hypotheses. For this, we just have to use merge
(proposition 5.3) to get subH qaqf and apply it to subH qaqf ⇒ subH ∅ which we get from
C[qaqf ].
